P5+1 Talks With Iran in Geneva, Switzerland
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Welcome back My Dear Shoevians to The Other Shoe. As promised, today I am sharing with all of you the very TEXT of the ‘Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action’ aka the ‘P5+1 Iran Nuclear Agreement’. Today’s article has taken several days to complete. I do this out of a love ofPEACE and the best possible future for our nation and its inhabitants. I do this for PEACE.
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Now, without further adieu, I give you… … …
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)
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PREAMBLE TO AGREEMENT:
PREAMBLE AND GENERAL PROVISIONS
i. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the E3/EU+3 (China, France, Germany, the
Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the High
Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy)
have decided upon this long-term Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA). This JCPOA, reflecting a step-by-step approach, includes the reciprocal
commitments as laid down in this document and the annexes hereto and is to
be endorsed by the United Nations (UN) Security Council.
ii. The full implementation of this JCPOA will ensure the exclusively peaceful
nature of Iran's nuclear programme.
iii. Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop or
acquire any nuclear weapons.
iv. Successful implementation of this JCPOA will enable Iran to fully enjoy its right
to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under the relevant articles of the
nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in line with its obligations therein, and
the Iranian nuclear programme will be treated in the same manner as that of
any other non-nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT.
v. This JCPOA will produce the comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Council
sanctions as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear
programme, including steps on access in areas of trade, technology, finance and
energy.
vi. The E3/EU+3 and Iran reaffirm their commitment to the purposes and principles
of the United Nations as set out in the UN Charter.
vii. The E3/EU+3 and Iran acknowledge that the NPT remains the cornerstone of the
nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of
nuclear disarmament and for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
viii. The E3/EU+3 and Iran commit to implement this JCPOA in good faith and in a
constructive atmosphere, based on mutual respect, and to refrain from any
action inconsistent with the letter, spirit and intent of this JCPOA that would
undermine its successful implementation. The E3/EU+3 will refrain from
imposing discriminatory regulatory and procedural requirements in lieu of the
sanctions and restrictive measures covered by this JCPOA. This JCPOA builds on
the implementation of the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) agreed in Geneva on 24
November 2013.
ix. A Joint Commission consisting of the E3/EU+3 and Iran will be established to
monitor the implementation of this JCPOA and will carry out the functions
provided for in this JCPOA. This Joint Commission will address issues arising
from the implementation of this JCPOA and will operate in accordance with the
provisions as detailed in the relevant annex.
x. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will be requested to monitor and
verify the voluntary nuclear-related measures as detailed in this JCPOA. The
IAEA will be requested to provide regular updates to the Board of Governors,
and as provided for in this JCPOA, to the UN Security Council. All relevant rules
and regulations of the IAEA with regard to the protection of information will be
fully observed by all parties involved.
xi. All provisions and measures contained in this JCPOA are only for the purpose of
its implementation between E3/EU+3 and Iran and should not be considered as
setting precedents for any other state or for fundamental principles of
international law and the rights and obligations under the NPT and other
relevant instruments, as well as for internationally recognized principles and
practices.
xii. Technical details of the implementation of this JCPOA are dealt with in the
annexes to this document.
xiii. The EU and E3+3 countries and Iran, in the framework of the JCPOA, will
cooperate, as appropriate, in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and
engage in mutually determined civil nuclear cooperation projects as detailed in
Annex III, including through IAEA involvement.
xiv. The E3+3 will submit a draft resolution to the UN Security Council endorsing
this JCPOA affirming that conclusion of this JCPOA marks a fundamental shift in
its consideration of this issue and expressing its desire to build a new
relationship with Iran. This UN Security Council resolution will also provide for
the termination on Implementation Day of provisions imposed under previous
resolutions; establishment of specific restrictions; and conclusion of
consideration of the Iran nuclear issue by the UN Security Council 10 years after
the Adoption Day.
xv. The provisions stipulated in this JCPOA will be implemented for their respective
durations as set forth below and detailed in the annexes.
xvi. The E3/EU+3 and Iran will meet at the ministerial level every 2 years, or earlier
if needed, in order to review and assess progress and to adopt appropriate
decisions by consensus.
I.
Iran and E3/EU+3 will take the following voluntary measures within the timeframe as
detailed in this JCPOA and its Annexes[1]
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“Iran will begin phasing out its IR-1 centrifuges in 10 years. During this period,
Iran will keep its enrichment capacity at Natanz at up to a total installed
uranium enrichment capacity of 5060 IR-1 centrifuges. Excess centrifuges and
enrichment-related infrastructure at Natanz will be stored under IAEA
continuous monitoring, as specified in Annex I. –“[2]
This is a MORE THAN 50% DECREASE in working centrifuges at Iran’s Natanz Fuel Enrichment plant. They HAD, roughly, 9,000first generation enrichment centrifuges going, that give them enough fuel for a single nuclear weapon in TWO months.
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NEXT –
“Iran will continue to conduct enrichment R&D in a manner that does not
accumulate enriched uranium. Iran's enrichment R&D with uranium for 10 years
will only include IR-4, IR-5, IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges as laid out in Annex I, and
Iran will not engage in other isotope separation technologies for enrichment of
uranium as specified in Annex I. Iran will continue testing IR-6 and IR-8
centrifuges, and will commence testing of up to 30 IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges
after eight and a half years,”[3]
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For more information on IR-8 centrifuges, Iran’s claims about these advanced centrifuges and their yield go here:
http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/IR8_Sept__2014.pdf
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Based on its long-term plan, for 15 years, Iran will carry out its uranium
enrichment-related activities, including safeguarded R&D exclusively in the
Natanz Enrichment facility, keep its level of uranium enrichment at up to 3.67%,
and, at Fordow, refrain from any uranium enrichment and uranium enrichment
R&D and from keeping any nuclear material.
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This greatly limits Iran ability to refine fissile material and store or stockpile fissile material. The IAEA has developed a strict ‘Known’ inspection schedule and also has the right and the ability to make spot inspections with as little as a 24 HOUR window. IAEA inspectors will wait just outside of facilities that are undergoing ‘spot inspections’ thereby inhibiting Iran’s ability to remove large items like centrifuges and shielded containers.
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Iran will convert the Fordow facility into a nuclear, physics and technology
centre. International collaboration including in the form of scientific joint
partnerships will be established in agreed areas of research. 1044 IR-1
centrifuges in six cascades will remain in one wing at Fordow. Two of these
cascades will spin without uranium and will be transitioned, including through
appropriate infrastructure modification, for stable isotope production. The other
four cascades with all associated infrastructure will remain idle. All other
centrifuges and enrichment-related infrastructure will be removed and stored
under IAEA continuous monitoring as specified in Annex I.
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THIS line item DECREASES Iran’s Uranium Enrichment facilities IN HALF! This is a MAJOR concession by Iran, and a HUGE WIN for America and our Allies.
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During the 15 year period, and as Iran gradually moves to meet international
qualification standards for nuclear fuel produced in Iran, it will keep its uranium
stockpile under 300 kg of up to 3.67% enriched uranium hexafluoride (UF6) or
the equivalent in other chemical forms. The excess quantities are to be sold
based on international prices and delivered to the international buyer in return
for natural uranium delivered to Iran, or are to be down-blended to natural
This is the VERY FIRST time any agreement or treaty, with Iran, has been successful in limiting the stockpiling of enriched uranium hexafluoride. When refined into a fissile state the 300KG of uranium is reduced to 2% of its initial mass[5]. Than means that a 300kg stockpile will result in 6KG of fissile material. The ‘Little Boy’ trigger-type atomic bomb, that was dropped on Hiroshima, contained 64KG of enriched Uranium, TEN TIMES the amount Iran will have at any given time. Far less, a fraction, of what is needed to great a twentieth century ‘atomic’ device/bomb.
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“ARAK, HEAVY WATER, REPROCESSING
8. Iran will redesign and rebuild a modernised heavy water research reactor in
Arak, based on an agreed conceptual design, using fuel enriched up to 3.67 %, in
a form of an international partnership which will certify the final design. The
reactor will support peaceful nuclear research and radioisotope production for
medical and industrial purposes. The redesigned and rebuilt Arak reactor will
not produce weapons grade plutonium. Except for the first core load, all of the
activities for redesigning and manufacturing of the fuel assemblies for the
redesigned reactor will be carried out in Iran. All spent fuel from Arak will be
shipped out of Iran for the lifetime of the reactor. This international partnership
will include participating E3/EU+3 parties, Iran and such other countries as may
be mutually determined. Iran will take the leadership role as the owner and as
the project manager and the E3/EU+3 and Iran will, before Implementation Day, conclude an official document which would define the responsibilities assumed
by the E3/EU+3 participants.”[6]
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Result, Iran will LOOSE one of it NEWEST refinement facilities and one of the ONLY ‘Heavy Water’reactors Iran has built. “There are some proliferation concerns about the reactor's ability to produce enough plutonium for several nuclear weapons each year.“[7] This is a tremendous loss to their weapons capability, but can be turned into a huge asset for the production of material for nuclear power plants.
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“There will be no additional heavy water reactors or accumulation of heavy
water in Iran for 15 years. All excess heavy water will be made available for
export to the international market."
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Combined with the loss of Arak, this concession all but cripples Iran capabilities for generating fissile material for more than a DECADE. A decade after this agreement ENDS. That means that Iran will NOT be at the point they are at TODAY until sometime in 2035!!!
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"For 15 years Iran will not, and does not intend to thereafter, engage in any
spent fuel reprocessing or construction of a facility capable of spent fuel
reprocessing, or reprocessing R&D activities leading to a spent fuel
reprocessing capability, with the sole exception of separation activities aimed
exclusively at the production of medical and industrial radio-isotopes from
irradiated enriched uranium targets.”[8]
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This concession should allay MUCH concern about Iran providing fissile or even ‘dirty bomb’ materials to; ISIS, Al Quida, the Taliban, or any other terrorist organizations for the next GENERATION. With this agreement, Iran significantly removes its role as state supported terrorism.
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“Iran will allow the IAEA to monitor the implementation of the voluntary
measures for their respective durations, as well as to implement transparency
measures, as set out in this JCPOA and its Annexes. These measures include: a
long-term IAEA presence in Iran; IAEA monitoring of uranium ore concentrate
produced by Iran from all uranium ore concentrate plants for 25 years;
containment and surveillance of centrifuge rotors and bellows for 20 years; use
of IAEA approved and certified modern technologies including on-line
enrichment measurement and electronic seals; and a reliable mechanism to
ensure speedy resolution of IAEA access concerns for 15 years, as defined in
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A historic measure, right here:
“a long-term IAEA presence in Iran; IAEA monitoring of uranium ore concentrate
produced by Iran from all uranium ore concentrate plants for 25 years;
containment and surveillance of centrifuge rotors and bellows for 20 years; use
of IAEA approved and certified modern technologies including on-line
enrichment measurement and electronic seals; and a reliable mechanism to
ensure speedy resolution of IAEA access concerns for 15 years,”
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A “LONG TERM PRESENCE OF THE IAEA I N IRAN!!! This is a concession America and the Western world has wanted for a generation, and President Obama and Sec. John Kerry GOT IT!
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“Iran will not engage in activities, including at the R&D level, that could
contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device, including uranium
or plutonium metallurgy activities”,[10]
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Thereby GREATLY LIMITING the SCIENCE that is NECESSARY for creating a nuclear device. Curtailing Iran’s ability to design, build and execute a VIABLE nuclear device for MORE THAN an GENERATION. This hobbles Iran’s plans for a nuclear bomb!
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Now, My Dear Shoevians, over the past two weeks we have all heard the shrill cries of Republicans that “America is giving money to Iran…” Just yesterday, July 27th, during Sec. Kerry’s testimony in front of Congress a Representative claimed “America is giving Iran a Signing bonus!!!” Strictly non-factual hyperbolic rhetoric, and below is the proof why! America is not giving any money to Iran. No, the United Nations is releasing money that Iran has already earned but was HELD due to international sanctions. Here is the financial remedies Republicans are desperate to spin into“America giving Iran Billions!’
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“The EU will terminate all provisions of the EU Regulation, as subsequently
amended, implementing all nuclear-related economic and financial sanctions,
including related designations, simultaneously with the IAEA-verified
implementation of agreed nuclear-related measures by Iran as specified in
Annex V, which cover all sanctions and restrictive measures in the following
areas, as described in Annex II:
i. Transfers of funds between EU persons and entities, including financial
institutions, and Iranian persons and entities, including financial institutions;
ii. Banking activities, including the establishment of new correspondent banking
relationships and the opening of new branches and subsidiaries of Iranian banks
in the territories of EU Member States;
iii. Provision of insurance and reinsurance;
iv. Supply of specialised financial messaging services, including SWIFT, for persons
and entities set out in Attachment 1 to Annex II, including the Central Bank of
Iran and Iranian financial institutions;
v. Financial support for trade with Iran (export credit, guarantees or insurance);
vi. Commitments for grants, financial assistance and concessional loans to the
Government of Iran;
vii. Transactions in public or public-guaranteed bonds;
viii. Import and transport of Iranian oil, petroleum products, gas and petrochemical
products;
ix. Export of key equipment or technology for the oil, gas and petrochemical
sectors;
x. Investment in the oil, gas and petrochemical sectors;
xi. Export of key naval equipment and technology;
xii. Design and construction of cargo vessels and oil tankers;
xiii. Provision of flagging and classification services;
xiv. Access to EU airports of Iranian cargo flights;
xv. Export of gold, precious metals and diamonds;
xvi. Delivery of Iranian banknotes and coinage;
xvii. Export of graphite, raw or semi-finished metals such as aluminum and steel, and
export or software for integrating industrial processes;
xviii. Designation of persons, entities and bodies (asset freeze and visa ban) set out in
Attachment 1 to Annex II; and
xix. Associated services for each of the categories above.
20. The EU will terminate all provisions of the EU Regulation implementing all EU
proliferation-related sanctions, including related designations, 8 years after
Adoption Day or when the IAEA has reached the Broader Conclusion that all
nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities, whichever is earlier.
21. The United States will cease the application, and will continue to do so, in
accordance with this JCPOA of the sanctions specified in Annex II to take effect
simultaneously with the IAEA-verified implementation of the agreed nuclearrelated
measures by Iran as specified in Annex V. Such sanctions cover the
following areas as described in Annex II:
i. Financial and banking transactions with Iranian banks and financial institutions
as specified in Annex II, including the Central Bank of Iran and specified
individuals and entities identified as Government of Iran by the Office of
Foreign Assets Control on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked
Persons List (SDN List), as set out in Attachment 3 to Annex II (including the
opening and maintenance of correspondent and payable through-accounts at
non-U.S. financial institutions, investments, foreign exchange transactions and
letters of credit);
ii. Transactions in Iranian Rial;
iii. Provision of U.S. banknotes to the Government of Iran;
iv. Bilateral trade limitations on Iranian revenues abroad, including limitations on
their transfer;
v. Purchase, subscription to, or facilitation of the issuance of Iranian sovereign
debt, including governmental bonds;
vi. Financial messaging services to the Central Bank of Iran and Iranian financial
institutions set out in Attachment 3 to Annex II;
vii. Underwriting services, insurance, or reinsurance;
viii. Efforts to reduce Iran’s crude oil sales;
ix. Investment, including participation in joint ventures, goods, services,
information, technology and technical expertise and support for Iran's oil, gas
and petrochemical sectors;
x. Purchase, acquisition, sale, transportation or marketing of petroleum,
petrochemical products and natural gas from Iran;
xi. Export, sale or provision of refined petroleum products and petrochemical
products to Iran;
xii. Transactions with Iran's energy sector;…”[11]
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NONE of these release of held funds will happen UNTIL “to take effect simultaneously with the IAEA-verified implementation of the agreed nuclear related measures by Iran as specified in Annex V.” MEANING that NO money or financial instruments are to be released UNTIL Iran MEETS with IAEA VERIFIED implementation!! No COMPLIANCE = NO MONEY!! Period.
This, right here, SHOOTS DOWN ALL Republican claims of “America giving Iran money for a “signing bonus” or that America is “giving Iran money for state sponsored terrorism”.
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Now, for America’s sanctions on Iran and any/all Congressional sanctions on Iran and Congressionally held funds from sale of oil from Iran.
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“Eight years after Adoption Day or when the IAEA has reached the Broader
Conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities,
whichever is earlier, the United States will seek such legislative action as may
be appropriate to terminate, or modify to effectuate the termination of, the
sanctions specified in Annex II on the acquisition of nuclear-related
commodities and services for nuclear activities contemplated in this JCPOA, to
be consistent with the U.S. approach to other non-nuclear-weapon states under
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Not until EIGHT YEARS after Adopition Day, or when the IAEA has reached the ‘Broader Conclusion’that “ALL nuclear material in Iran REMAINS in PEACEFUL activities…” BINGO! NO money until EIGHT YEARS of Iran PROVING that their nuclear materials are ONLY being used for “Peaceful purposes”. Period!
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“Trust but VERIFY”
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“The E3/EU+3 will take adequate administrative and regulatory measures to
ensure clarity and effectiveness with respect to the lifting of sanctions under
this JCPOA. The EU and its Member States as well as the United States will
issue relevant guidelines and make publicly accessible statements on the
details of sanctions or restrictive measures which have been lifted under this
JCPOA. The EU and its Member States and the United States commit to consult
with Iran regarding the content of such guidelines and statements, on a regular
basis and whenever appropriate.”[13]
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Here the treaty begins outlining the verification process, as it is to be handled by the E3/EU3 & America. This paragraph shows details of the structure of guidelines/statements given during the process.
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“The E3/EU+3 and Iran commit to implement this JCPOA in good faith and in a
constructive atmosphere, based on mutual respect, and to refrain from any
action inconsistent with the letter, spirit and intent of this JCPOA that would
undermine its successful implementation. Senior Government officials of the
E3/EU+3 and Iran will make every effort to support the successful
implementation of this JCPOA including in their public statements[2]. The
E3/EU+3 will take all measures required to lift sanctions and will refrain from
imposing exceptional or discriminatory regulatory and procedural requirements
in lieu of the sanctions and restrictive measures covered by the JCPOA.”[14]
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This paragraph ties the E3/EU+3 and America to a transparent process and assures that no punitiveactions are taken, either unilaterally or in concert with other nations. This protects Iran from legislative actions, not arising directly from the member nations, but from their legislative bodies.
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“The EU and its Member States and the United States, consistent with their
respective laws, will refrain from any policy specifically intended to directly and
adversely affect the normalisation of trade and economic relations with Iran
inconsistent with their commitments not to undermine the successful
implementation of this JCPOA.”[15]
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Prevents “normalization” of trade and economic relations outside of the parameters outlined in the JCPOA, thereby limiting member nations to the letter of the agreement and not the spirit.
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The following two sections outline the same parameters and structure dealing with; Banking and Financial Instruments. All sanctions shall be lifted only according to the JCPOA.
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Section 32 –
“EU and E3+3 countries and international participants will engage in joint
projects with Iran, including through IAEA technical cooperation projects, in the
field of peaceful nuclear technology, including nuclear power plants, research
reactors, fuel fabrication, agreed joint advanced R&D such as fusion,
establishment of a state-of-the-art regional nuclear medical centre, personnel
training, nuclear safety and security, and environmental protection, as detailed
in Annex III. They will take necessary measures, as appropriate, for the
implementation of these projects.”[16]
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This paragraph further limits “nuclear technology” for peaceful purposes in Iran strictly limiting them to “power production… medical… research reactors… and fuel fabrication”. Thereby cutting OFF all pathways to; nuclear weapons, nuclear fissile materials and research and development of nuclear technologies for weaponry.
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The following quote(s) outline the “Implementation” of the JCPOA and all of its articles and agreements.
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“The milestones for implementation are as
follows:
i. Finalisation Day is the date on which negotiations of this JCPOA are concluded
among the E3/EU+3 and Iran, to be followed promptly by submission of the
resolution endorsing this JCPOA to the UN Security Council for adoption without
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This “finalization day” has already passed, as we are already in possession of the finished document. This paragraph outlines that there should be NO delays, once the agreement is reached, leading tofinalization.
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“ii. Adoption Day is the date 90 days after the endorsement of this JCPOA by the UN
Security Council, or such earlier date as may be determined by mutual consent
of the JCPOA participants, at which time this JCPOA and the commitments in this
JCPOA come into effect. Beginning on that date, JCPOA participants will make
necessary arrangements and preparations for the implementation of their JCPOA
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Clearly stated, the “Adoption Day” (beginning of the clock for all time related elements of the agreement, begins after the passing of the 90th day post United Nations approval. This gives all of theP5+1 a stopwatch for all the elements contained within the agreement.
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“Implementation Day” is the date on which, simultaneously with the IAEA report
verifying implementation by Iran of the nuclear-related measures described in
Sections 15.1. to 15.11 of Annex V, the EU and the United States take the
actions described in Sections 16 and 17 of Annex V respectively and in
accordance with the UN Security Council resolution, the actions described in
Section 18 of Annex V occur at the UN level.”[19]
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Annex V Part 15-
15. Iran will implement the nuclear-related measures as specified in Annex I:
15. Paragraphs 3 and 10 from Section B on "Arak Heavy Water Research Reactor";
15. Paragraphs 14 and 15 from Section C on "Heavy Water Production Plant";
15. Paragraphs 27, 28, 29, 29.1 and 29.2 from Section F on "Enrichment Capacity";
15. Paragraphs 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41 and 42 from Section G on
"Centrifuges Research and Development";
15. Paragraphs 45, 46, 46.1, 46.2, 47.1, 48.1 from Section H on "Fordow Fuel
Enrichment Plant";
15. Paragraphs 52, 54 and 55 from Section I on "Other Aspects of Enrichment";
15. Paragraphs 57 and 58 from Section J on "Uranium Stocks and Fuels";
15. Paragraph 62 from Section K on "Centrifuge Manufacturing";[20]
Section ‘B’ #2,3 & 10
B. ARAK HEAVY WATER RESEARCH REACTOR
2. Iran will modernise the Arak heavy water research reactor to support peaceful nuclear
research and radioisotopes production for medical and industrial purposes. Iran will
redesign and rebuild the reactor, based on the agreed conceptual design (as attached
to this Annex) to support its peaceful nuclear research and production needs and
purposes, including testing of fuel pins and assembly prototypes and structural
materials. The design will be such as to minimise the production of plutonium and not to”[21]
produce weapon-grade plutonium in normal operation. The power of the redesigned
reactor will not exceed 20 MWth. The E3/EU+3 and Iran share the understanding that
the parameters in the conceptual design are subject to possible and necessary
adjustments in developing the final design while fully preserving the above-mentioned
purposes and principles of modernisation.
3. Iran will not pursue construction at the existing unfinished reactor based on its original
design and will remove the existing calandria and retain it in Iran. The calandria will be
made inoperable by filling any openings in the calandria with concrete such that the
IAEA can verify that it will not be usable for a future nuclear application. In redesigning
and reconstructing of the modernized Arak heavy water research reactor, Iran will
maximise the use of existing infrastructure already installed at the current Arak research[22]
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OK! My Dear Shoevians, do you remember the ‘Preamble’ that I stated was so very important?Everything you see in the above paragraphs IS included in the ‘Statements of Intent and Structure’of the Preamble’. I have included ALL the text of this ONE FULL Textual Path of “Implementation Day” so that you, My Dear Shoevians, can see and understand how the Preamble is the skeleton of the agreement. All of the text, above, outlines the “Implementation Day” prerequisites and agreed upon actions. I have included just the entire text-path for Section B on "Arak Heavy Water Research Reactor because including ALL the EIGHT sections would give you about ten pages of that kind of reading.
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As I indicated, these eight text-paths ALL concern the; closing of, refurbishing of for “peaceful pruposes”, and/or destruction of nuclear facilities with in Iran. FYI – This IS a very good look INTOthe ‘Private Agreement’ between the IAEA and Iran (that Senators and Representatives have beenscreaming… for). ALL of this text is available if you follow the embedded link at the very end of this article. I will now move on to the next section of the agreement.
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“Transition Day is the date 8 years after Adoption Day or the date on which the
Director General of the IAEA submits a report stating that the IAEA has reached
the Broader Conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful
activities, whichever is earlier. On that date, the EU and the United States will
take the actions described in Sections 20 and 21 of Annex V respectively and
Iran will seek, consistent with the Constitutional roles of the President and
Parliament, ratification of the Additional Protocol.”[23]
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UN General Horo and Sec. John Kerry
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“Transition Day” – Quite simply; the IAEA has been allowed all necessary and requested inspections to the satisfaction of their personnel to reach the “Broader Conclusion” that (indeed, and against the howlings of our Republican Party) “all nuclear material in Iran remains in peacefulactivities…” This is the day when Iran has met the: requirements, parameters, structure and textual pathways of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. That Iran is in complete compliance with the agreement, and has remained in compliance for the term and scope of the agreement.
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“UN Security Council resolution Termination Day is the date on which the UN
Security Council resolution endorsing this JCPOA terminates according to its
terms, which is to be 10 years from Adoption Day, provided that the provisions
of previous resolutions have not been reinstated. On that date, the EU will take
the actions described in Section 25 of Annex V.
35. The sequence and milestones set forth above and in Annex V are without
prejudice to the duration of JCPOA commitments stated in this JCPOA”[24].
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This paragraph defines, for the United Nations, that the ‘Termination Day’ (for the U.N.) is “10 years from Adoption Day, provided that the provisions
of previous resolutions have not been reinstated”. Meaning, one decade of Iran NOT screwing the pooch. Simple enough, eh?
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OK, My Dear Shoevians, that brings us to the very end of the ‘sections’ of the agreement. You see,First there is the ‘Preamble’. Then there are the ‘sections’. After that comes the “Dispute Resolution Mechanism” and finally the ‘Annexes’ that contain all the; tonnage, ship names, facility names and locations, and all of the ‘Nuclear Assets of Iran’. I am going to share with you the“Dispute Resolution Mechanism” but am not going to quote and explain all the ‘Annexes’ of this agreement. It is now Noon, and if I work quickly I can have this article; finished editing and adding left-out footnotes, uploaded, images (if any) embedded and publishing… … … by dinner time, tonight. That is my goal.
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DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISM:
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“If Iran believed that any or all of the E3/EU+3 were not meeting their
commitments under this JCPOA, Iran could refer the issue to the Joint
Commission for resolution; similarly, if any of the E3/EU+3 believed that Iran
was not meeting its commitments under this JCPOA, any of the E3/EU+3 could
do the same. The Joint Commission would have 15 days to resolve the issue,
unless the time period was extended by consensus. After Joint Commission
consideration, any participant could refer the issue to Ministers of Foreign
Affairs, if it believed the compliance issue had not been resolved. Ministers
would have 15 days to resolve the issue, unless the time period was extended
by consensus. After Joint Commission consideration – in parallel with (or in lieu
of) review at the Ministerial level - either the complaining participant or the
participant whose performance is in question could request that the issue be
considered by an Advisory Board, which would consist of three members (one
each appointed by the participants in the dispute and a third independent
member). The Advisory Board should provide a non-binding opinion on the
compliance issue within 15 days. If, after this 30-day process the issue is not
resolved, the Joint Commission would consider the opinion of the Advisory
Board for no more than 5 days in order to resolve the issue. If the issue still has
not been resolved to the satisfaction of the complaining participant, and if the
complaining participant deems the issue to constitute significant nonperformance,
then that participant could treat the unresolved issue as grounds
to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part
and/or notify the UN Security Council that it believes the issue constitutes
significant non-performance.”[25]
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Simple, this is like the ‘Arbitration Agreement’ all of us sign when we; go to a doctor, are admitted to a hospital or treatment center. This is an outline of the process and critical pathway for resolution of any/all disputes. Either with Iran, or with the E3/EU+3. BOTH sides have equal access to the dispute mechanism.
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“Upon receipt of the notification from the complaining participant, as described
above, including a description of the good-faith efforts the participant made to
exhaust the dispute resolution process specified in this JCPOA, the UN Security
Council, in accordance with its procedures, shall vote on a resolution to
continue the sanctions lifting. If the resolution described above has not been
adopted within 30 days of the notification, then the provisions of the old UN
Security Council resolutions would be re-imposed, unless the UN Security
Council decides otherwise. In such event, these provisions would not apply with
retroactive effect to contracts signed between any party and Iran or Iranian
individuals and entities prior to the date of application, provided that the
activities contemplated under and execution of such contracts are consistent
with this JCPOA and the previous and current UN Security Council resolutions.
The UN Security Council, expressing its intention to prevent the reapplication of
the provisions if the issue giving rise to the notification is resolved within this
period, intends to take into account the views of the States involved in the issue
and any opinion on the issue of the Advisory Board. Iran has stated that if
sanctions are reinstated in whole or in part, Iran will treat that as grounds to
cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part”-[26].
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This paragraph outlines the United Nations role in; lifting of sanctions outside the agreement aspart of a ‘Dispute Resolution’. This means that the United Nations Security Council can vote to: keep sanctions in place OR remove sanctions currently in place as part of any/all ‘Dispute Resolutions’ process.
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My Dear Shoevians, the following are the remaining headings for the Annexes that make up the following 130 pages.
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Annex I – Nuclear-related measures
- GENERAL
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B. ARAK HEAVY WATER RESEARCH REACTOR
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C. HEAVY WATER PRODUCTION PLANT
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D. OTHER REACTOR
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E. SPENT FUEL REPROCESSING ACTIVITIES
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F. ENRICHMENT CAPACITY
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G. CENTRIFUGES RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
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H. FORDOW FUEL ENRICHMENT
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I. OTHER ASPECTS OF ENRICHMENT
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J. URANIUM STOCKS AND FUELS
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K. CENTRIFUGE MANUFACTURING
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L. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL AND MODIFIED CODE 3.1
.” 64. Iran will notify the IAEA of provisional application of the Additional Protocol to its
Safeguards Agreement in accordance with Article 17(b) of the Additional Protocol
pending its entry into force, and subsequently seek ratification and entry into force,
consistent with the respective roles of the President and the Majlis (Parliament).
65. Iran will notify the IAEA that it will fully implement the Modified Code 3.1 of the
Subsidiary Arrangement to Iran’s Safeguards Agreement as long as the Safeguards
Agreement remains in force.”[27]
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Outlining provisions of the inclusion of, and handling, modified protocol and code within the agreement.
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M. PAST AND PRESENT ISSUES OF CONCERN
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“Iran will complete all activities as set out in paragraphs 2, 4, 5, and 6 of the “Roadmap
for Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues”, as verified by the IAEA in its
regular updates by the Director General of the IAEA on the implementation of this
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N.MODERN TECHNOLOGIES AND LONG TERM PRESENCE OF IAEA
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(This is the VERIFY language… PART of Lonnie and ‘others’)
“67. For the purpose of increasing the efficiency of monitoring for this JCPOA, for 15 years
or longer, for the specified verification measures:
67. Iran will permit the IAEA the use of on-line enrichment measurement and electronic
seals which communicate their status within nuclear sites to IAEA inspectors, as well as
other IAEA approved and certified modern technologies in line with internationally
accepted IAEA practice. Iran will facilitate automated collection of IAEA measurement
recordings registered by installed measurement devices and sending to IAEA working
space in individual nuclear sites.
67. Iran will make the necessary arrangements to allow for a long-term IAEA presence,
including issuing long-term visas, as well as providing proper working space at nuclear
sites and, with best efforts, at locations near nuclear sites in Iran for the designated
IAEA inspectors for working and keeping necessary equipment.
67. Iran will increase the number of designated IAEA inspectors to the range of 130-150
within 9 months from the date of the implementation of the JCPOA, and will generally
allow the designation of inspectors from nations that have diplomatic relations with Iran,
consistent with its laws and regulations.”[29]
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Well, My Dear Shoevians, here are some TEETH! This ‘Section N’ contains the essential language for the IAEA to have:
“of on-line enrichment measurement and electronic
seals which communicate their status within nuclear sites to IAEA inspectors, as well as
other IAEA approved and certified modern technologies in line with internationally
accepted IAEA practice. Iran will facilitate automated collection of IAEA measurement
recordings registered by installed measurement devices and sending to IAEA working
space in individual nuclear sites”
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This IS unprecedented access to ALL Iran’s nuclear facilities. NEVER before in the history of nuclear agreements (SALT-1,2,3 – ANY USSR/US nuclear agreements). This gives the IAEA “LONG TERM PRESENCE IN IRAN”!!!! This, TOO, is UNPRECEDENTED in the history of the IAEA and nuclear agreements of the 20th century. Finally, Iran will increase the number of designated IAEA inspectors to the range of 130-150 within 9 months from the date of the implementation of the JCPOA” The IAEA will have an UNPRECEDENTED NUMBER of inspectors ON THE GROUND IN IRAN!
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Let’s review; Electronic WIRELESS tagging of: centrifuges, reactors, fuel rods ect… ALL ACCESS passes to ALL Iran’;s nuclear facilities and (finally) an UNPRECEDENTED number – 130-150 IAEA inspectors ON THE GROUND 7/365! Now, THAT IS VERIFICATION!
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O. TRANSPARENCY RELATED TO URANIUM ORE CONCENTRATE (UOC)
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“68. Iran will permit the IAEA to monitor, through agreed measures that will include
containment and surveillance measures, for 25 years, that all uranium ore concentrate
produced in Iran or obtained from any other source, is transferred to the uranium
conversion facility (UCF) in Esfahan or to any other future uranium conversion facility
which Iran might decide to build in Iran within this period.
69. Iran will provide the IAEA with all necessary information such that the IAEA will be able
to verify the production of the uranium ore concentrate and the inventory of uranium ore
concentrate produced in Iran or obtained from any other source for 25 years.”[30]
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The IAEA will MONITOR (via containment and surveillance measures) ALL uranium ore concentrate for… … … TWNETY-FIVE YEARS!!! (that’s a generation to you and me)
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P. TRANSPARENCY RELATED TO ENRICHMENT
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“70. For 15 years, Iran will permit the IAEA to implement continuous monitoring, including
through containment and surveillance measures, as necessary, to verify that stored
centrifuges and infrastructure remain in storage, and are only used to replace failed or
damaged centrifuges, as specified in this Annex.
71. Iran will permit the IAEA regular access, including daily access as requested by the
IAEA, to relevant buildings at Natanz, including all parts of the FEP and PFEP, for 15
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For FIFTEEN YEARS “all access continuous monitoring” via “containment and surveillance measures” of ALL enrichment processed at ALL facilities for FIFTEEN YEARS!
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Q. ACCESS
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Pretty much outlined above; all access via; electronic, containment and surveillance measures from fifteen to twenty-five years. That is unprecedented access and monitoring.
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R. CENTRIFUGE COMPONENT MANUFACTURING TRANSPARENCY
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This gets very technical, let me layman this for you.
"Iran and the IAEA will take the necessary steps for containment and surveillance on
centrifuge rotor tubes and bellows for 20 years.”[32]
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A complete inventory of ALL centrifuges, both domestic and military, and of all rotors and tubes. Constant surveillance via the electronic, containment. (This includes those nifty Wi-Fi GPS tags that can SCREAM at the IAEA)
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S. OTHER URANIUM ISOTOPE SEPARATION ACTIVITIES
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T. ACTIVITIES WHICH COULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT
OF A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE
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“82. Iran will not engage in the following activities which could contribute to the development
of a nuclear explosive device:
82. Designing, developing, acquiring, or using computer models to simulate nuclear
explosive devices.
82. Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using multi-point explosive detonation
systems suitable for a nuclear explosive device, unless approved by the Joint
Commission for non-nuclear purposes and subject to monitoring.
82. Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using explosive diagnostic systems
(streak cameras, framing cameras and flash x-ray cameras) suitable for the
development of a nuclear explosive device, unless approved by the Joint Commission
for non-nuclear purposes and subject to monitoring.
82. Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using explosively driven neutron
sources or specialized materials for explosively driven neutron sources.”[33]
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P5+1 Ministers With Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif in Vienna
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Well, My Dear Shoevians, that brings me to the end of this ‘Part Two 0 The Agreement’ of my article ‘Iran – Deal or War’. I hope that everyone has enjoyed and learned… I know that I have. Now, for all my Facebook friends, IF you have read this article and still have concerns? Write to me via my email addy at my new blog location. It is included in the ‘About’ page of the new blog. These two articles have really pretty much wiped me out.
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I really wanted to put this information into the hands of you, My Dear Shoevians, that you can have informed and educated discussions about this agreement. As well, I very much wanted to end thehyperbolic rhetoric about “giving signing bonuses” and “America giving money to Iran for terrorism”. AS you can ALL now, plainly, see there are NO provisions for ANY payments by Americato Iran.
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If Iran keeps to this deal, for Twenty-Five years, then THEIR (already earned by held by EU/America) assets will be RETURNED to the government and people of Iran. There is NO ‘pay-for-play’ in this agreement.
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Finally, thank you all for dropping by. If you have found this article informative and even educational? PLEASE ‘Like’ and ‘Share’ this article on all your social media.
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Adieu!
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Thank you!
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FYI - The FULL TEXT of the JCPOA I reviewed here is available for download here: Text of P5+1 Iran Nuclear Deal
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Danny Hanning Writer, Editor, Research Staff and Publisher at The Other Shoe
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© 2010 – 2015 Hanning Web Wurx and The Other Shoe
[1] Page(s) #2-5 of JCPOA
[4] Page(s) #7-8 of JCPOA
[8] Page(s) 9-10 of JCPOA
[11] Page(s) #11-14 of JCPOA
[26] Page(s) #20-21 of JCPOA
[29] Page(s) #39-40 JCPOA
Danny Hanning Writer, Editor, Research Staff and Publisher at The Other Shoe
